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INTRODUCTION
In Fall 2013, when federal district judge Shira Scheindlin held the New York
City Police Department's stop-and-frisk policy to be unconstitutionally discrimi-
* Louis Stein Chair and Director, Louis Stein Center for Law and Ethics, Fordham University School of
Law. © 2015. Bruce A. Green.
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natory, l the police department and its supporters were outraged.2 Even months
later, when newly elected Mayor Bill de Blasio moved to fulfill his campaign
pledge to accept the court's rulings and reform police policy, 3 police representa-
tives remained angry and sought to intervene in order to press forward with an
appeal.4 One can understand why. The police viewed the rulings as an
impediment to their work. Beyond that, the judge's finding that police officers'
daily conduct was not just unlawful but "biased"5 -a term sounding very much
like "racist"-was a stinging rebuke to dedicated public servants of diverse
backgrounds who worked hard to keep the city safe.
One can equally understand why three federal appellate judges might have
been skeptical of the district court's findings when the case first came before
them, even before briefing on the merits. The lower court opinions, extensively
reviewing evidence submitted during two months of hearings, were not just
scholarly, but, perhaps from some perspectives, excessively so. While various
conservative jurists from Chief Justice Roberts on down have made sport of legal
scholarship,6 Judge Scheindlin might have seemed to be placing legal scholars on
a pedestal. She declared the plaintiffs' expert, a law and public health professor,
the victor in the "battle of the experts" over academics from other disciplines
proffered by the City.7  She endorsed non-doctrinal legal scholarship-
conservative jurists' least favorite kind-arguing "that unconscious racial bias,"
an unseeable psychological force, "continues to play an objectively measurable
1. See Ligon v. City of New York, 925 F Supp. 2d 478, 486 (S.D.N.Y 2013) [hereinafter Ligon 1]; Floyd v.
City of New York, 959 F. Supp. 2d 540, 627 (S.D.N.Y. 2013), appeal dismissed (Sept. 25, 2013) [hereinafter
Floyd 1]; Floyd v. City of New York, 959 E Supp. 2d 668, 671 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) [hereinafter Floyd 2]. See
generally Stephen Rushin, Federal Enforcement of Police Reform, 82 FORDHAM L. REv. 3189 (2014).
2. See Bloody Outrage, N.Y. POST, Jan. 9, 2013, available at http://www.nypost.com/2013/01/09/bloody-
outrage/ (referring to Judge Scheindlin as a "loony-left judge"); Rocco Parascandola et al., NYPD's
Stop-and-Frisk Blasted by Judge, Mayor Bloomberg Fights Back, DAILY NEWS (New York), Aug. 13, 2013,
http://www.nydailynews.com/new-york/stop-frisk-violated-rights-judge-article- 1.1424287 (claiming that Judge
Scheindlin "brushed aside NYPD concerns that reforms will make the city a more dangerous place").
3. Benjamin Weiser & Joseph Goldstein, Mayor Says New York City Will Settle Suits on Stop-and-Frisk
Tactics, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 31, 2014, atAl.
4. Ligon v. City of New York, 743 F.3d 362, 365 (2d Cir. 2014) (remanding cases for settlement negotiations
and expressing no view on intervention motions); Floyd v. City of New York, 302 F.R.D. 69, 128 (S.D.N.Y. July
30, 2014) (denying intervention motion and approving parties' proposed modification of court's Remedial
Order).
5. See, e.g., Floyd, 959 F. Supp. 2d at 587 88.
6. See Adam Liptak, The Lackluster Reviews That Lawyers Love to Hate, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 21, 2013, at A15
(quoting Chief Justice Roberts, "Pick up a copy of any law review that you see and the first article is likely to be,
you know, the influence of Immanuel Kant on evidentiary approaches in 18th-century Bulgaria, or something,
which I'm sure was of great interest to the academic that wrote it, but isn't of much help to the bar."); Adam
Liptak, When Rendering Decisions, Judges Are Finding Law Reviews Irrelevant, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 19, 2007, at
AS ("'I haven't opened up a law review in years,' said Chief Judge Dennis G. Jacobs of the federal appeals court
in New York. 'No one speaks of them. No one relies on them."'). I and others have questioned these views. See
generally Bruce A. Green, The Legal Ethics Scholarship of Ted Schneyer: The Importance of Being Rigorous,
53 ARIZ. L. REV. 365 (2011).
7. See Floyd 1,959 E Supp. 2d at 578.
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role in many people's decision processes," including those of the police.8 Perhaps
most galling, the judge appointed law professors to help remedy the perceived
problem by looking over the shoulders of the police9-and not just any law
professors, but critical race theorists! 10
Even so, when the Second Circuit panel hastily removed Judge Scheindlin
from the lawsuit, based on a supposed "appearance of impropriety,"" many
thoughtful observers were shocked, maybe even independently of their views of
the merits of the civil rights lawsuit. 12 Initial criticisms focused on the appellate
court's process, especially its failure to solicit briefing from the parties or to hear
from the district judge before ruling. Those who dug deeper may also have
noticed that the appellate court's substantive rationales for reassigning the case
sharply departed from prior federal case law on judicial disqualification, which
the appellate court largely ignored. 13 One might have been prompted to ask,
"what's really going on here?" Retired federal district judge Nancy Gertner led a
group of amici, of whom I was one, who worried that Judge Scheindlin's poorly
explained removal would chill judicial independence. 14 In public commentary,
Judge Gertner went further, succumbing to the temptation to accuse the appellate
judges of "bias" on their own part. 15 Others may have felt the same urge. 16
8. Id. at 580 n.157.
9. See Floyd 2, 959 F. Supp. 2d at 676; see also Jamie Schram, Ivory Tower Eggheads to Monitor Stop and
Frisk, N.Y. POST, Sept. 18, 2013, available at http://www.nypost.com/2013/09/18/ivory-tower-eggheads-to-
monitor-stop-and-frisk/.
10. See Heather MacDonald, Shira's Cop-Haters, N.Y. POST, Sept. 20, 2013, available at http://nypost.con
2013/09/20/shiras-cop-haters/ ("Now [Judge Scheindlin has] given further evidence of her slanted worldview
with her unremittingly one-sided appointments to an 'Academic Advisory Council' for the remedial phase of the
case, Floyd v. New York.... Almost without exception, the members represent that wing of the academic and
advocacy world that sees race and racism as the predominant features of American life. Some examples: Tanya
Hernandez teaches Critical Race Theory, employment discrimination and the 'science of implicit bias' at
Fordham Law. Critical Race Theory holds that race and racism structure nearly everything about the American
legal system.").
11. Ligon v. City of New York, 538 Fed. App'x 101, 102 (2d Cir. 2013). For an in-depth description and
analysis of the Second Circuit's disqualification decision, what led up to it, and ensuing litigation, see Anil
Kalhan, Stop and Frisk, Judicial Independence, and the Ironies of Improper Appearances, 27 GEO. J. LEGAL
ETHICS 1043 (2014).
12. See, e.g., Jeffrey Toobin, The Preposterous Removal of Judge Scheindlin, NEW YORKER (Oct. 31, 2013),
available at http://www.newyorker.com/online/blogs/newsdesk/20 13/10/the-preposterous-removal-of-judge-
scheindlin.html; Anil Kalhan, The Appearance of Impropriety and Partiality, DORF ON LAW (Nov. 5, 2013),
http://www.dorfonlaw.org/2013/1 1/the-appearance-of-impropriety-and.html.
13. See infra notes 127 38; see also Kalhan, supra note 11, at 1091 95.
14. Brief of Six Retired U.S. District Court Judges & Thirteen Professors of Legal Ethics as Amici Curiae
Supporting Plaintiff-Appellant's Motion Reconsideration by the En Banc Court, Ligon v. City of New York, 538
Fed. App'x 101 (2013) (No. 13-3123).
15. Emily Bazelon, Shut Up, Judge! A Misguided Appeals Court Tries to Silence and Quash Stop-and-
Frisk Judge Shira Scheindlin, SLATE (Nov. 1, 2013,3:51 PM), http://www.slate.com/articles/news-and-politics/
jurisprudence/2013/1l/nypd-and-judge-shira-scheindlin 2nd circuit-appeals-court-judges-try-to.html
(quoting retired federal district judge Nancy Gertner: "If there is bias here, it is that of the 2nd Circuit that went
out of its way to disqualify a judge outside of the normal processes, looking beyond the record, and without
giving her a chance to respond.").
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In retrospect, however, despite what social scientists tell us about the
prevalence of implicit bias, it is arguably unprofessional, unfair, and unproduc-
tive to accuse judges of bias, even when-indeed, especially when-their
decisions seem otherwise inexplicable. Should lawyers and legal academics
publicly indulge in such surmise? 17 This essay examines the opportunity and
temptation to do so and the legitimacy of acceding to this temptation. Part II
offers the Second Circuit's recusal of Judge Scheindlin as an example of a case in
which critics could be tempted to speculate about unconscious bias. Part III offers
some reflections on whether lawyers should employ implicit bias rhetoric in the
criminal justice process. It concludes that implicit bias in judging may be better
discussed in the abstract or in the aggregate than in the context of any particular
judicial decision.
I. CRIMINAL JUSTICE DISCOURSE AND IMPLICIT BIASES
Do social science insights into implicit bias require us to think differently
about how we discuss racial justice in the criminal process, especially in the
judicial process? Implicit biases are unconscious, non-deliberate attitudes and
stereotypes that affect individuals' decisions for better or worse.18 Everyone has
implicit biases of one kind or another. There is a burgeoning body of literature on
the implications of implicit biases for criminal justice 9 as for other areas of
law. 20 We are told that implicit biases, including racial biases, may influence
every player in the criminal process-police,2 1 prosecutors,22 defense
16. See Kalhan, supra note 11, at 1113 ("[A] number of observers have suggested that it was [the appellate
judges], rather than Judge Scheindlin, who 'breached the rules' of judicial conduct and created an appearance of
impropriety and partiality... by acting sua sponte ... and by ousting [Judge Scheindlin] so precipi-
tously... [the appellate judges] created a high risk that observers would reasonably question their impartiality
on that basis alone.").
17. For an earlier critique of the "unconscious bias discourse," see Ralph Richard Banks & Richard
Thompson Ford, (How) Does Unconscious Bias Matter?, 58 EMoRY L.J. 1053, 1064 (2009).
18. See Anthony G. Greenwald & Linda Hamilton Krieger, Implicit Bias: Scientific Foundations, 94 CALIF.
L. REv. 945, 951 (2006).
19. See generally, e.g., Sheri Lynn Johnson, Unconscious Racism and the Criminal Law, 73 CORNELL L.
REv. 1016 (1988); Shima Baradaran, Race, Prediction and Discretion, 81 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 157 (2013);
Andrew E. Taslitz, Trying Not to Be Like Sisyphus: Can Defense Counsel Overcome Pervasive Bias in the
Criminal Justice System?, 45 TEX. TECH L. REv. 315 (2012).
20. See, e.g., Samuel R. Bagenstos, Implicit Bias, "Science," and Antidiscrimination Law, 1 HARV. L. &
PoL'Y REv. 477 (2007); Jerry Kang, Trojan Horses of Race, 118 HARv. L. REv. 1489 (2005); Linda Hamilton
Krieger, The Content of Our Categories: A Cognitive Bias Approach to Discrimination and Equal Employment
Opportunity, 47 STAN. L. REv. 1161 (1995); Nancy Levit, Confronting Conventional Thinking: The Heuristics
Problem in Feminist Legal Theory, 28 CARDOZO L. REv. 391 (2006); Reshma M. Saujani, "The Implicit
Association Test": A Measure of Unconscious Racism in Legislative Decision-Making, 8 MICH. J. RACE & L.
395 (2003).
21. See, e.g., Adam Benforado, Frames of Injustice: The Bias We Overlook, 85 IND. L.J. 1333 (2010).
22. See, e.g., Carla-Michelle Adams, Criminalization in Shades of Color: Prosecuting Pregnant Drug-
Addicted Women, 20 CARDOZO J.L. & GENDER 89 (2013); Robert J. Smith & Justin D. Levinson, The Impact of
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lawyers, jurors24 and, of course, judges.2 5
The more we hear about implicit bias, the stronger is the temptation to infer
that unconscious attitudes and prejudices are present in virtually any controver-
sial judicial decision. That is, we may easily ascribe disfavored decisions to the
unseen gravitational pull of unconsciously biased thought processes rather than,
as in the old days, to conscious motivations that judges intentionally hid26 or just
to their plain bad judgment. Recently, a retired judge accused himself of
unconscious racial bias to explain why a ruling he issued more than a decade
earlier should be set aside.2 7 Lawyers and judges may be tempted to level similar
accusations against each other. Should we give in to this temptation?
Until attention shifted to implicit bias, 28 discussions of racial injustice in the
criminal process focused on other problems of racial injustice that were more
easily detected. There was, to begin with, the historic problem of overt racism.
The stories of the "Scottsboro Boys"'29 and the "Groveland Boys"'30 recall a time
when overt racism and prejudice were more prevalent in the criminal justice
system as elsewhere in U.S. society than today. Many Supreme Court decisions
establishing procedural protections in criminal cases, particularly during the
Warren Court era, responded to this problem, although the decisions were usually
Implicit Racial Bias on the Exercise ofProsecutorial Discretion, 35 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 795 (2012); Andrew E.
Taslitz, Judging Jena's D.A.: The Prosecutor and Racial Esteem, 44 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 393 (2009).
23. See, e.g., Andrea D. Lyon, Race Bias and the Importance of Consciousness for Criminal Defense
Attorneys, 35 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 755 (2012); L. Song Richardson & Phillip Atiba Goff, Implicit Racial Bias in
Public Defender Triage, 122 YALE L.J. 2626 (2013).
24. See, e.g., Justin D. Levinson, Forgotten Racial Equality: Implicit Bias, Decisionmaking, and
Misremembering, 57 DUKE L.J. 345 (2007).
25. See, e.g., Chris Guthrie et al., Blinking on the Bench: How Judges Decide Cases, 93 CORNELL L. REV. 1
(2007); Jerry Kang et al., ImplicitBias in the Courtroom, 59 UCLAL. REV. 1124 (2012); Jeffrey J. Rachlinski et
al., Does Unconscious Racial Bias Affect Trial Judges?, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1195 (2009).
26. See JEROME FRANK, COURTS ON TRIAL: MYTH AND REALITY IN AMERICAN JUSTICE (1949) (asserting that
judges hide reasons of which they are conscious).
27. James C. McKinley Jr., Ex-Brooklyn Judge Seeks Reversal of His Verdict in 1999 Killing, N.Y. TIMES,
Dec. 12, 2013, at A31.
28. The social science literature on implicit bias appears first to have influenced legal academic discussions
of discrimination in the civil context. See, e.g., DeanaA. Pollard, Unconscious Bias and Self- CriticalAnalysis:
The Case for a Qualified Evidentiary Equal Employment Opportunity Privilege, 74 WASH. L. REV. 913 (1999).
The legal literature on implicit bias in policing, sentencing and other criminal settings developed somewhat
later. See, e.g., R. Richard Banks, Jennifer L. Eberhardt & Lee Ross, Discrimination and Implicit Bias in a
Racially Unequal Society, 94 CALIF. L. REV. 1169 (2006). The idea that many individuals are unconscious of
their racial prejudices predates all of the legal literature drawing on recent social science studies. See, e.g.,
Charles R. Lawrence III, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning with Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN.
L. REV. 317 (1987).
29. See Norris v. Alabama, 294 U.S. 587 (1935); Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932); JAMES GOODMAN,
STORIES OF ScOTTSBORO (1995).
30. See Shepherd v. Florida, 341 U.S. 50 (1951); GILBERT KING, DEVIL IN THE GROVE: THURGOOD MARSHALL,
THE GROVELAND BOYS, AND THE DAWN OF A NEW AMERICA (2012).
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not cast expressly as responses to racial prejudice.31
Attention later turned to police and prosecution practices that have racially
discriminatory effects. Sometimes the practices in question reflect explicit racial
considerations, as in the case of racial profiling,32 but not always. Critics have
pointed to statistical evidence of the racially discriminatory nature of the national
"war on drugs ' 33 and of states' implementation of capital punishment.34 Police
practices, such as traffic stops, requiring quick, on-the-spot judgments, are said to
be particularly susceptible to racial bias.35 Supreme Court decisions make it hard
for an individual criminal defendant to prove and remedy unexpressed racial
discrimination, 36 but the New York City stop-and-frisk litigation illustrates that
police policies may sometimes be challenged successfully in civil actions based
in part on their aggregate discriminatory impact.
The discourse on racial injustice has grown trickier, however, with the
development of social science teachings on implicit bias. Studies show that
unconscious attitudes and prejudices may distort anyone's decision making, at
least absent a conscious effort and procedural counter-measures to avoid their
influence. 38 Rather than being part of the solution, courts may be part of the
problem, because well-intentioned judges, like others, are susceptible to implicit
racial bias or to other biases that have the effect of advantaging whites or
disadvantaging racial minorities.39
31. See, e.g., Paul D. Butler, Poor People Lose: Gideon and the Critique of Rights, 122 YALE L.J. 2176,
2080 81 & n.17 (2013) (observing that Warren Court's criminal procedure cases were implicitly about racial
justice) (citing authority); Pamela S. Karlan, Race, Rights, and Remedies in CriminalAdjudication, 96 MICH. L.
REv. 2001, 2002 (1998) ("Although the Supreme Court's initial forays into criminal procedure surely had been
motivated in large part by concern with the racial unfairness of southern criminal justice, the Court developed a
series of formally race-neutral rules for constraining police, prosecutors, and the courts.").
32. See, e.g., Brandon Garrett, Remedying Racial Profiling, 33 COLUM. HUM. RTs. L. REv. 41, 48-49 (2001);
Samuel R. Gross & Debra Livingston, Racial Profiling UnderAttack, 102 COLUM. L. REv. 1413, 1415 (2002).
33. See MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW: MASS INCARCERATION IN THE AGE OF COLORBLINDNESS
102 (2012); Nekima Levy-Pounds, Going Up in Smoke: The Impacts of the Drug War on Young Black Men, 6
ALB. Gov'T L. REV. 563, 566 (2013).
34. See Jennifer L. Eberhardt et al., Looking Deathworthy: Perceived Stereotypicality of Black Defendants
Predicts Capital-Sentencing Outcomes, 17 PSYCHOL. Sci. 383 (2006); John C. McAdams, Racial Disparity and
the Death Penalty, 61 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 153, 153 54 (1998).
35. See, e.g., Mario L. Barnes & Robert S. Chang, Analyzing Stops, Citations, and Searches in Washington
and Beyond, 35 SEATTLE U. L. REv. 673, 693 (2012); David A. Harris, The Stories, the Statistics, and the Law:
Why "Driving While Black" Matters, 84 MINN. L. REV. 265, 280 81 (1999).
36. See, e.g., United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 470 (1996); McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 313
(1987).
37. See Floyd 1, 959 F. Supp. 2d 540.
38. For discussions of measures to reduce the impact of implicit racial bias, see, e.g., Calvin K. Lai et al.,
Reducing Implicit Prejudice, 7 Soc. & PERSONALITY PSYCHOL. COMPASS 315 (2013); National Center for State
Courts, Strategies to Reduce the Influence of Implicit Bias, available at http://www.ncsc.org//media/Files/PDF/
Topics/Gender%20and%20Racial%20Fairness/IB_Strategies_033012.ashx (last visited Nov. 29, 2014). For a
discussion of the difficulty of successfully doing so, see Greenwald & Krieger, supra note 18, at 962 65.
39. See Jeffrey J. Rachlinski et al., Does Unconscious Racial Bias Affect Trial Judges?, 84 NOTRE DAME L.
REv. 1195, 1196 97 (2009); see also supra note 25 and accompanying text.
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Scholars tell us that it is not only unconscious racial bias that may be
influential. Concerns have been raised that lawyers and judges may be
susceptible to implicit biases based on gender,40 sexual orientation, 41 and
economic class, 4 2 among others .
4 3
In addition to biases based on stereotypical attitudes toward social groups,
there are other implicit biases. Scholars have identified a host of cognitive
biases--or mental shortcuts-that distort individuals' judgment without their
awareness. For example, Alafair Burke has explored how prosecutors' disclosure
decisions may be influenced by, among others, "confirmation bias" (starting with
a theory and then looking for evidence that confirms it),44 "selective information
processing" ("the tendency to evaluat[e] evidence based on [one's] existing
beliefs"),45 or "belief perseverance" ("the tendency to adhere to theories even
when new information wholly discredits the theory's evidentiary basis").4 6
Bringing these sorts of heuristics together under the umbrella of "tunnel vision,"
scholars have discussed generally how these cognitive biases lead to wrongful
convictions.4 7
Judges' unconscious social-group stereotypes and cognitive biases are very
different from the "judicial biases" defined by codes of judicial conduct and other
regulatory law. Judicial conduct codes enjoin judges to perform their duties
"without bias or prejudice, 48 as well as "fairly and impartially., 49 Further,
judges are required to disqualify themselves in proceedings in which their
"impartiality might reasonably be questioned," including when they have "a bias
or prejudice concerning a party or a party's lawyer. ' '50 But judges are not subject
to disqualification under judicial conduct codes for unconscious, unarticulated
40. See, e.g., Mahzarin R. Banaji & Anthony Greenwald, Implicit Gender Stereotyping in Judgments of
Fame, 68 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 181, 197 (1995); Justin D. Levinson & Danielle Young, Implicit
Gender Bias in the Legal Profession: An Empirical Study, 18 DUKE J. GENDER L. & PoC'Y 1, 17 (2010).
41. See, e.g., Cynthia Lee, The Gay Panic Defense, 42 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 471,476 (2008).
42. See Michele Benedetto Neitz, Socioeconomic Bias in the Judiciary, 61 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 137 142-43
(2013); Donald C. Nugent, Judicial Bias, 42 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 1, 48-49 (1994).
43. Nugent, supra note 42, at 48 (noting the possibility that judges may be influenced by regional bias).
44. See Alafair Burke, Brady's Brainteaser: The Accidental Prosecutor and Cognitive Bias, 57 CASE W. RES.
L. REV. 575, 577 78 (2007) (discussing the role of confirmation bias in prosecutorial disclosure); Alafair S.
Burke, Revisiting Prosecutorial Disclosure, 84 IND. L.J. 481, 495 (2009) (same).
45. See Burke, Brady's Brainteaser, supra note 44, at 578.
46. Alafair S. Burke, Improving Prosecutorial Decision Making: Some Lessons of Cognitive Science, 47
WM. & MARY L. REV. 1587, 1599 1600 (2006).
47. Keith A. Findley & Michael S. Scott, The Multiple Dimensions of Tunnel Vision in Criminal Cases, 2006
WIs. L. REV. 291, 292 94 (2006); Bruce A. Green & Ellen Yaroshefsky, Prosecutorial Discretion and
Post-Conviction Evidence of Innocence, 6 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 467, 488 89 (2009); Dianne L. Martin, Lessons
About Justice from the "Laboratory" of Wrongful Convictions: Tunnel Vision, the Construction of Guilt and
Informer Evidence, 70 UMKC L. REV. 847, 848 (2002).
48. ABA MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT R. 2.3(A) (2011) [hereinafter MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL
CONDUCT].
49. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT R. 2.2.
50. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT R. 2.11(A)(1).
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biases. Judicial bias under the law means something else entirely. Judges may be
disqualified because of particular relationships, such as familial or business
relationships with a party or lawyer, that justify a presumption or create an
appearance that the judge will be unfairly predisposed to one side. On rare
occasion, judges who otherwise would be presumed to be fair-minded have also
been disqualified for giving voice to biases: Judges who make statements
indicating that they are predisposed to favor one party over another-for
example, a judge's statement from the bench that he is "for the little guy, not for
the government"5 '-have been regarded as expressing impermissible judicial
bias.
Parties are entitled to an unbiased judge, in the narrow sense defined by the
judicial conduct codes, and a party who believes a judge should be disqualified
for bias may seek a judicial resolution by filing a timely motion.52 But judges are
presumed to be unbiased, despite backgrounds and life experiences that they
bring to the task of judging and that might shape their dispositions one way or the
other. Common sense and experience suggest that philosophical biases may in
fact affect judges' decisions, but the law governing judicial conduct pretends that
they do not exist or matter.5 3 The law presumes that judges will decide cases
fairly, regardless of these philosophical predispositions, and as a practical matter,
it could not be otherwise, since judges are not blank slates.54 Moreover, the right
to an unbiased judge, even in the narrow, legal sense, is not absolute: A party that
sits on its heels after learning of alleged grounds for judicial recusal ordinarily
waives that right, because otherwise parties might wait to see how the judge rules
before deciding whether to complain.5 5 Of course, parties have no right or
meaningful ability to remove judges who hold implicit biases; if they did, there
might be no one left to judge.
Consequently, implicit racial biases and other implicit biases are presumably
ubiquitous but not disqualifying. The extent to which implicit biases are likely to
influence decisions in the criminal process is open to debate.56 That an implicit
bias affected the result in any given case is inherently unprovable. And yet,
51. In re Wood, 720 So.2d 506, 507 (Fla. 1998).
52. See, e.g., Travelers Ins. Co. v. Liljeberg Enter., Inc., 38 F.3d 1404, 1408 09 (5th Cir. 1994); United States
v. Studley, 783 F.2d 934, 939 (9th Cir. 1986).
53. See, e.g., Martin H. Redish & Lawrence C. Marshall, Adjudicatory Independence and the Values of
Procedural Due Process, 95 YALE L.J. 455, 502 03 (1986) ("The bias that comes from the judge's intellectual or
political position, however, differs from the type of bias that occurs when an individual adjudicates an issue with
which she has had prior involvement, either in the position of an advocate or as a judge in an earlier stage of the
case. The judge then has a strong motivation to hold that her initial decision was the correct one, and to a certain
extent she acts as judge in her own case.").
54. See, e.g., Bruce A. Green, May Judges Attend Privately Funded Educational Programs? Should Judicial
Education Be Privatized?: Questions ofJudicial Ethics and Policy, 29 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 941, 965 67 (2002);
Redish & Marshall, supra note 53, at 502 03.
55. See, e.g., Madsen v. Prudential Fed. Sav.& Loan Ass'n, 767 P.2d 538 (Utah 1988).
56. See, e.g., Shima Baradaran, Race, Prediction and Discretion, 81 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 157 (2013).
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virtually whenever one disapproves of a judge's opinion, it is possible to surmise
that unconscious biases and prejudices are at work, and if their role cannot be
proved, it also cannot be disproved.
II. NYC STOP-AND-FRISK LITIGATION: A CASE STUDY
In the Summer of 2013, after extensive factual submissions and argument,
federal district judge Shira Scheindlin issued lengthy, extensively reasoned
decisions holding that New York City policing policy resulted in racially
discriminatory stops and frisks.57 Outraged critics accused the judge of being
one-sided 8 and the administration of outgoing Mayor Michael Bloomberg
hurriedly appealed and asked the Second Circuit to stay the decision, 9 while Bill
de Blasio, the Democratic candidate to succeed him, pledged to withdraw the
appeal if elected.60
When the lawyers for the outgoing administration appeared in the Court of
Appeals to argue the City's motion, the judges raised an issue that no party had
formally raised, briefed, or argued either in the district court or the court of
appeals-namely, whether Judge Scheindlin was impermissibly biased. Soon
after the argument, only days before the election, and without ever hearing from
Judge Scheindlin, the panel issued a short opinion removing her from the
stop-and-frisk cases based on judicial ethics provisions requiring judicial
impartiality. 61 The urgency was not apparent, since no proceedings were pending
in the district court. Soon after, the panel withdrew its original order and
published a new opinion with a somewhat different rationale but reaching the
same result.
The Second Circuit decisions are like a matryoshka doll: the district judge
found that the police were biased (and implied in interviews that her judicial
colleagues were, too); the court of appeals found that the district judge was
biased; and a critic might suspect the circuit judges of bias. The decisions provide
a vehicle for illustrating the varying meanings of "bias" in the criminal justice
process, including in judging, and for exploring the legitimacy of accusing judges
of "implicit bias" when they make problematic decisions.
57. See Ligon 1,925 K Supp. 2d 478; Floyd 1, 959 K Supp. 2d 540; Floyd 2, 959 K Supp. 2d 668.
58. See Parascandola et al., supra note 2; MacDonald, supra note 10.
59. See Benjamin Weiser & Joseph Goldstein, City Asks Court to Vacate Rulings on Policing Tactic, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 10, 2013, at A31.
60. See Benjamin Weiser, Judges Decline to Reverse Stop-and-Frisk Ruling, All But Ending Mayor's Fight,
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 23, 2013, at A21.
61. Ligon v. City of New York, 736 F.3d 118, 124-27 (2d Cir. 2013); Ligon v. City of New York, 538 Fed.
App'x 101, 102 03 (2d Cir. 2013); see also Ligon v. City of New York, 736 F.3d 231, 232 (2d Cir. 2013)
(denying City's motion district judge's motion to appear and argue); Ligon v. City of New York, 736 K3d 166,
170 (2d Cir. 2013) (denying district judge's motion to appear and argue).
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A. THE LONG LEAD-UP TO JUDGE SCHEINDLIN'S REMOVAL
The civil rights class actions before Judge Scheindlin were successors to an
earlier one, Daniels v. City of New York, which was filed during the Giuliani
administration and concluded at the end of 2007. The plaintiffs in Daniels alleged
that the New York City police engaged in racial profiling in stopping and frisking
young Black and Latino men, rather than acting on reasonable, articulable
suspicion as required by Fourth Amendment case law.62 Judge Scheindlin
certified the class action in 2001. An appellate panel over which Circuit Judge
Jose Cabranes presided initially agreed to stay discovery and hear an appeal from
her certification decision but then concluded that its own order was improvi-
dently granted and dismissed the appeal.6 3 Along the way, Judge Cabranes may
have formed impressions that he would recall a dozen years later when, perhaps
coincidentally, an appeal in the successor cases came before him.64
In 2003, the parties in Daniels reached a settlement, which the district court
approved, requiring the police department to adopt a Racial Profiling policy,
supervise, monitor and train its officers regarding the policy, and provide the
plaintiffs with compilations of data on their ongoing stop-and-frisk practices.65
The agreement gave the district court oversight of compliance through the end of
2007.
As the Daniels case was coming to a close in December 2007, the plaintiffs
sought to extend the court's supervision.6 6 They alleged that, by maintaining
racially discriminatory policing practices, the City was violating the settlement
agreement.67 The judge commenced a hearing on the motion at 4:50 p.m. on
Friday, December 21-that is, just ten minutes before federal offices closed for a
four-day holiday.68 Although she gave both sides time to be heard, Judge
Scheindlin expressed little sympathy for the plaintiffs' request. Having reviewed
the parties' papers, she sided with the City's argument that the settlement
agreement required it only to adopt a policy, which the City had done. 6 9 The
agreement did not obligate the City to comply with its policy.7 0 If the plaintiffs
had evidence of ongoing discriminatory practices, Judge Scheindlin observed,
62. Daniels v. City of New York, 198 F.R.D. 409, 411 (S.D.N.Y 2001).
63. Daniels v. City of New York, 13 Fed. App'x 20, 21 (2d Cir. 2001).
64. See Kalhan, supra note 11, at 1073 81 (describing Judge Cabranes's role in the October 2013 oral
argument on the City's motion to stay Judge Scheindlin's decisions in the later stop-and-frisk cases).
65. Daniels v. City of New York, No. 99 Civ. 1695(SAS), 2007 WL2077150, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. July 16, 2007).
66. Ligon v. City of New York, 736 F.3d 118, 132 (2d Cir. 2013).
67. Id. at 134 35.
68. President Bush signed an executive order that year closing federal offices on December 24, the day
before the Christmas holiday, giving federal employees a four-day weekend. See Exec. Order No. 13453, 3
C.ER. 13453 (2007).
69. Ligon, 736 F.3d at 124-46.
70. Id.
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that could be the subject of a new lawsuit, but not this one.7 1
It was Judge Scheindlin's questions and observations during this hearing to
which the Second Circuit would return six years later. But it is hard to imagine
that at the close of business that Friday afternoon, the civil rights plaintiffs
thought Judge Scheindlin was favoring them. She expressed no sympathy for
their request, but favored the City's argument from the start.72 In pressing the
plaintiffs' counsel, Judge Scheindlin asked questions such as, "Do you have
another lawsuit to bring?, 73 which may have sounded more like a challenge
"put up or shut up" 74 -than encouragement. Her point, in any event, was that,
given the City's fulfillment of the settlement agreement, this was the wrong
context for deciding the plaintiffs' discrimination claim, particularly given the
alternative of a separate lawsuit. Although the judge softened in the end,
ultimately observing that if the plaintiffs did bring a lawsuit and designated it as a
"related case," she would accept it, it is unlikely that anyone at the time
understood that she was offering advice or encouragement or that the plaintiffs'
counsel needed any. The City walked away from the hearing, for the moment, the
big winner.
Counsel for the Daniels plaintiffs followed the next month with a class action
lawsuit, Floyd v. City of New York,7 5 that they undoubtedly had contemplated
since well before the December hearing. In Floyd, as previously in Daniels, the
complaint was that the police stopped individuals without suspicion based on
racial profiling.76 The plaintiffs identified the case as related to Daniels, and it
was sent to Judge Scheindlin, who accepted it as she had said she would, in
accordance with district court policy at the time giving her sole discretion
whether to do SO. 7 7 Later, in 2010, Davis v. City of New York, 78 a civil rights
action challenging police practices in public housing, was assigned to Judge
Scheindlin as a case related to Floyd, and in 2012, another related class action,
Ligon v. City of New York, 7 9 came to her. Never once-not when Judge
Scheindlin accepted these cases, not at any time during the lengthy pretrial
71. Id.
72. See id. at 124.
73. See id. at 124 ("[W]hy don't you file a lawsuit? ... So instead of struggling to tell[] me about a
stipulation of settlement, why don't you craft a lawsuit?... I don't understand why we have to potentially have,
you know, months of briefing when it does fit under this stipulation or it doesn't.... Why do you need that if you
have a lawsuit? Bring it. They have a written policy, right? ... If you think they are violating their written
policy, sue them.").
74. Courts have appropriated the concept. See, e.g., Goodman v. Nat'l Sec. Agency, Inc., 621 E3d 651, 654
(7th Cir. 2010) ("We often call summary judgment the 'put up or shut up' moment in litigation.., by which we
mean that the non-moving party is required to marshal and present the court with the evidence she contends will
prove her case. And by evidence, we mean evidence on which a reasonable jury could rely." (citations omitted)).
75. Floyd v. City of New York, 739 E Supp. 2d 376 (S.D.N.Y. 2010).
76. Id. at 378.
77. See infra note 121 and accompanying text; Kalhan, supra note 11 at 1102 09.
78. Davis v. City of New York, No. 10 Civ. 0699(SAS), 2011 WL 1742748, at * 1 (S.D.N.Y. May 5, 2011).
79. Ligon v. City of New York, 910 E Supp. 2d 517 (S.D.N.Y. 2012); see Kalhan, supra note 11, at 1058.
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proceedings, and not in the end when she conducted the trial-did the City ask
Judge Scheindlin to consider sending these cases to another judge on the theory
that the cases were unrelated to Daniels or to each other or on the theory that
during the hearing in the Daniels lawsuit she had expressed bias in favor of the
civil rights plaintiffs or against the City.
Judge Scheindlin tried these cases over the course of two months from March
to May, 2013.80 The cases were prominent in New York City.81 In anticipation of
a ruling, several journalists were interested in profiling Judge Scheindlin and
sought to interview her.8 2 Although judicial ethics rules restrict judges from
making public statements about pending and impending cases83 and from
engaging in various other extrajudicial activities that might undermine judicial
impartiality or interfere with the administration of justice,84 they do not require
judges to be cloistered.85 Judges may speak or write about themselves, their
general approach to judging, their judicial philosophy, the law, or many other
matters.86 Some judges stay out of the public spotlight but others choose to make
themselves and their ideas publicly available in any of several ways, including by
writing books or articles, or through participation in lectures and continuing legal
education programs.8 7 Supreme Court Justices and other judges who are
nationally or locally noteworthy sometimes submit to interviews, while avoiding
discussing particular current cases.88 With the stop-and-frisk cases, Judge
Scheindlin's day had come, and she agreed to sit for several interviews, including
with New Yorker writer Jeffrey Toobin, who had interviewed Supreme Court
80. Floyd 1, 959 E Supp. 2d at 572.
81. See supra note 2 (explaining that each of the major city newspapers the New York Times, the Daily
News, the New York Post, and Newsday published multiple stories about the hearings).
82. Ligon v. City of New York, 736 F.3d 118, 131 n.2 (2d Cir. 2013).
83. See MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT R. 2.10(A). See generally Nancy Gertner, Remarks of Hon.
Nancy Gertner, 64 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 449 (2009); Mark I. Harrison & Keith Swisher, When Judges
Should Be Seen, Not Heard: Extrajudicial comments Concerning Pending Cases and the Controversial
Self-Defense Exception in the New Code of Judicial Conduct, 64 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 559 (2009); Michael
D. Schoepf, Note, Removing the Judicial Gag Rule: A Proposal for Changing Judicial Speech Regulations to
Encourage Public Discussion ofActive Cases, 93 MINN. L. REv. 341 (2008).
84. See MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT R. 3.1.
85. See generally Green, supra note 54, at 967 68.
86. See MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT R. 2.10(D) (E).
87. Judge Richard Posner of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit is the most prolific
contemporary jurist. For a list of his publications, see Richard A. Posner: Publications, THE UNIV. OF CHI. L,
SCH. (Oct. 19, 2014, 10:59 PM), http://www.law.uchicago.edu/node/79/publications.
88. See, e.g., ABC News: Interview by Katie Couric with Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Associate Justice,
United States Supreme Court (ABC television broadcast July 31, 2014), http://www.abcnews.go.comWNT/
video/ruth-bader-ginsburg-interview-katie-couric-24782947; The Daily Show: Interview by Jon Stewart with
Justice Sonia Sotomayor Associate Justice, United States Supreme Court (Comedy Central television broadcast
Jan. 21, 2013), http://thedailyshow.cc.com/videos/hjb44w/exclusive sonia-sotomayor-extended-interview-
pt 1; CBS News: Interview by Lesley Stahl with Justice Antonin Scalia, Associate Justice, United States
Supreme Court (CBS television broadcast April 24, 2008), http://www.cbsnews.com/news/justice-scalia-on-the-
record/.
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Justices for prior profiles. 89
As required by judicial ethics rules, Judge Scheindlin avoided discussing the
pending stop-and-frisk cases. She discussed some uncontroversial subjects such
as her background, her family, and her preference as a judge for writing opinions
over presiding over trials. 90 But the interviews were not entirely innocuous.
Evidently in all of the interviews, the judge talked about judicial independence. 91
This is itself unobjectionable-indeed, judicial ethics canons regard indepen-
dence as an essential judicial trait92 -but in affirming her own independence,
Judge Scheindlin stressed an unwillingness to show the government the
favoritism that, apparently in her view, it receives from judges who come from a
prosecutorial background. 93 On their face, the judge's remarks did not express
impermissible judicial bias-that is, favoritism toward one side or the other-but
just the opposite. Although some, including her judicial colleagues, might have
taken umbrage at the suggestion that she was fairer than other judges, Judge
Scheindlin was expressing a commitment to ruling even-handedly without
favoring either side. And she did not express a novel insight in observing that
some judges, especially those who were former prosecutors, were more favorably
disposed toward the government.
94
Judge Scheindlin also responded to City representatives' apparent efforts to
discredit her in anticipation of her rulings by misleadingly characterizing her
record in prior criminal cases. The Mayor's office had recently claimed that in her
published decisions Judge Scheindlin ruled in favor of individuals' Fourth
Amendment claims more often than other judges.9 5 She responded that the figure
was meaningless since most decisions did not result in published opinions, and
described the report as painful, inappropriate and intimidating.
96
One might have wondered whether Judge Scheindlin's concern over the City's
conduct outside the context of the pending lawsuits would affect her disposition
89. Jeffrey Toobin, Rights and Wrongs: A Judge Takes on Stop-and-Frisk, NEW YORKER, May 27, 2013, at
36. See Kalhan, supra note 11, at 1063464.
90. See Ligon v. City of New York, 736 F.3d 118, 151 (2d Cir. 2013) (reprinting articles).
91. See, e.g., id. at 159, 161.
92. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 1 ("A judge shall uphold the integrity and independence of the
judiciary.").
93. See Toobin, supra note 89 (quoting Judge Scheindlin: "Too many judges, especially because so many of
our judges come out of that office, become government judges .... I don't think I'm the favorite of the U.S.
Attorney's office for the Southern District. Because I'm independent. I believe in the Constitution. I believe in
the Bill of Rights. These issues come up, and I take them quite seriously. I'm not afraid to rule against the
government."); Larry Neumeister, NY "Frisk" Judge Calls Criticism "Below -the-Belt," ASSOCIATED PRESS,
May 19, 2013, http://www.bigstory.ap.org/article/ny-frisk-judge-calls-criticism-below-belt.
94. Before his appointment to the federal bench, Judge Jed Rakoff leveled a more emphatic charge against
the judiciary, and evidently, his belief was not held to disqualify him from judicial service. See Jed S. Rakoff,
How Can You Defend Those Crooks, N.YL.J., Sept. 25, 1990 ("When it comes to criminal cases.... too many
judges evidence a blatant and continuing bias in favor of the prosecution.").
95. See Kalhan, supra note 11, at 1068 69.
96. Neumeister, supra note 93.
2015]
THE GEORGETOWN JOURNAL OF LEGAL ETHICS
toward the City in the litigation. But the City never sought to disqualify Judge
Scheindlin on this basis, and for good reasons. First, a judge cannot avoid having
general attitudes, positive or negative, toward the administration of a locality in
which she lives. A government entity is unlike an individual party: a judge who
lives and works in a locale cannot avoid interacting with its representatives and
forming attitudes toward it, and, as an engaged member of the public, a judge
cannot avoid forming impressions of public officials. The law presumes that
judges put such feelings aside. And, as a practical matter, utter indifference
toward the sovereignty cannot be a prerequisite for deciding cases in which it is a
party. Here, of course, the judge's consternation was a response to the City's
extrajudicial attack on her professional work. But if a party could move to
disqualify the judge based on displeasure that the party itself deliberately
fostered, litigants would have a formula for engineering the removal of any judge
they disfavored. What is key is that neither the City's attack on Judge
Scheindlin's prior work nor the judge's response specifically addressed the cases
pending before her.
In August 2013, several months after the interviews, Judge Scheindlin issued
an almost 200-page opinion, extensively reviewing the evidence and the law.
9 7
The opinion was dispassionate; it did not express any kind of disqualifying bias.
In brief, Judge Scheindlin found that the police department had a practice of
making unconstitutional stops and unconstitutional frisks (i.e., without the
requisite level of suspicion), that the police department disproportionately
targeted blacks and Hispanics, and that the City was liable because of its
deliberate indifference to the police practice. 98 In a separate opinion, she ordered
preliminary remedial measures, including the appointment of a monitor, revi-
sions to police policies, training materials and documentation, a pilot project for
recording stops, and a "joint remedial process for developing supplemental
reports." 99 The following month, Judge Scheindlin denied the City's motion to
stay these remedial measures while it appealed, and she advanced the remedial
process by appointing an Academic Advisory Council to participate in the
process.10
The judge's findings must have stung, not simply because she ruled against the
City, but because she found that the conduct of the police and the City were
influenced by unconscious racial bias. In large part, this finding relied on the
plaintiffs' expert's analysis of police reports of stops and frisks. The expert's
97. Floyd 1, 959 E Supp. 2d 540.
98. See id.
99. See Floyd 2, 959 E Supp. 2d at 686. This opinion addressed remedies in both Floyd and Ligon.
100. See Charisma L. Miller, Brooklyn Law School Professor to Head Stop-and-Frisk Committee, BROOKLYN
DAILY EAGLE (Sept. 23, 2013), available at http://www.brooklyneagle.com/articles/brooklyn-law-school-
professor-head-stop-and-frisk-committee-2013-09-23-120000. See also notes 9 & 10 and accompanying text,
supra.
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statistical analysis showed that (1) racial composition is a better predictor than
crime rate of the rate of stops in a locale, (2) blacks and Hispanics are more likely
to be stopped than whites, (3) after a stop, blacks were thirty percent more likely
than whites to be arrested, (4) blacks and Hispanics who were stopped were more
likely to be subject to force, and (5) cases against blacks were more likely to be
dropped than those against whites, suggesting that the stops were less likely to be
justified by objective evidence.10 1 The judge discredited the defense expert in
part because he appeared to proceed from the premise that it is not "plausible that
officers' decisions regarding whether to stop a person may be swayed by
conscious or unconscious racial bias," and in part because he could not identify
any race-neutral factors to explain why blacks and Hispanics were stopped at a
disproportionate rate. 10 2 Judge Scheindlin's opinion also referred to social
science research on unconscious racial bias. In particular, she observed that
police justified their stops of blacks and Hispanics based on "furtive movements"
more often than stops of whites, and suggested that this may be explained by the
influence of unconscious bias on police officers' "rapid, intuitive impressions" of
individuals' movement. 103
B. THE SECOND CIRCUIT'S QUESTIONABLE PROCESS
Others have remarked on the procedural irregularity of what came next.104 In a
nutshell, the City asked the Second Circuit to stay the judge's remedial process
pending its appeal. The case was assigned to a three-judge panel of which the
presiding judge was Judge Cabranes, who coincidentally had presided over an
appeal in Daniels twelve years prior. On October 31, 2013, two weeks after
hearing argument on the motion, the panel issued an opinion staying proceedings
pending appeal, scheduling the filing of briefs, and, on its own initiative,
101. Floyd 1, 959 E Supp. 2d at 560.
102. Id. at 586-87.
103. Id. at 578 (finding that "an officer's impression of whether a movement was 'furtive' may be affected by
unconscious racial biases"). Judge Scheindlin further observed:
Other recent psychological research has shown that unconscious racial bias continues to play an
objectively measurable role in many people's decision processes. It would not be surprising if many
police officers share the latent biases that pervade our society. If so, such biases could provide a
further source of unreliability in officers' rapid, intuitive impressions of whether an individual's
movements are furtive and indicate criminality. Unconscious bias could help explain the otherwise
puzzling fact that NYPD officers check "Furtive Movements" in 48% of the stops of blacks and 45%
of the stops of Hispanics, but only 40% of the stops of whites. There is no evidence that black people's
movements are objectively more furtive than the movements of white people.
Id. at 580-81.
104. Kalhan, supra note 11, at 1085 1113; Jeffrey Toobin, The Last Word on Stop and Frisk?, NEW YORKER,
Nov. 11, 2013, http://www.newyorker.com/news/daily-commeni/the-last-word-on-stop-and-frisk [hereinafter
Toobin, The Last Word]; Louis J. Virelli III, What "Stop-and-Frisk" Can Teach Us About the First Amendment
and Judicial Recusal, 47 CONN. L. REv. 13, 17 (2014).
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removing Judge Scheindlin from the case.1 0 5 The court's explanation was spare:
it stated that Judge Scheindlin "ran afoul" of the judicial code provision requiring
judges to "avoid the appearance of impropriety in all activities" (1) by improperly
applying the "related case rule" and (2) "by a series of media interviews and
public statements purporting to respond publicly to criticism of the District
Court." 10 6 The panel remanded the case solely for the purpose of assigning a new
district judge whose task would be to "implement this Court's mandate staying all
proceedings and otherwise await further action by the Court of Appeals on the
merits of the ongoing appeals." 10 7 It appended to its opinion the December 21,
2007 Daniels transcript and three articles recounting interviews with the district
judge. 108 In The New York Post, a former prosecutor hailed the decision, calling
Judge Scheindlin "the quintessential liberal activist judge with an obvious
anti-police bias."109
The opinion was procedurally unusual and perhaps unprecedented for reasons
on which others have remarked,110 among them being: the City had never sought
Judge Scheindlin's removal or argued that she violated the judicial code, the
related case rule, or any other provision cited by the Second Circuit governing
judicial conduct, and Judge Scheindlin never addressed the question on her own
initiative. 11 The appellate panel launched its inquiry into the district judge's
conduct without any prompting. 112 It then proceeded to conduct its own
fact-finding, reaching outside the record for the Daniels transcript and the three
articles.1 13 While the panel might have remanded for additional fact-finding, it
declined to do so and later rebuffed Judge Scheindlin's request to be heard.
114
Believing that it "was in full possession of the relevant facts,"1 15 the court did not
consider whether additional evidence or explanation might have put the transcript
and articles in a different light or might have suggested a different construction
than the one that the panel ascribed to them. It issued a hurried and curt opinion in
a context where there was no evident reason to rush: once the panel issued the
stay, there was nothing for a district judge to do other than wait.
105. Ligon v. City of New York, 538 736 F.3d 118, 121 (2d Cir. 2013).
106. Id. at 123 24.
107. Id. at 123.
108. Id. at 130-65.
109. Michel E. Bongiorno, The Slapdown the Stop-and-Frisk Judge Deserved, N.Y. POST (Oct. 31, 2013,
11:46 PM), available at http://www.nypost.com/2013/10/3 1/the-slapdown-judge-shira-deserved.
110. See, e.g., Nancy Gertner, Which Judges Breached the Rules?, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 3, 2013, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2013/11/03/judges-appearance-of-impartiality/which-judges-
breached-the-rules; Kalhan, supra note 11; Toobin, supra note 12; Dan Wise, Removing the Judge Who Ruled
'Stop and Frisk' Unconstitutional Is a Blow to Justice, THE NATION (Jan. 8, 2014), http://www.thenation.com/
article/177845/removing-judge-who-ruled- stop-and-frisk-unconstitutional-blow-justice#.
111. Kalhan, supra note 11, at 1080-82.
112. Id. at 1080.
113. Id. at 1081.
114. Ligon v. City of New York, 736 F.3d 166 (2d Cir. 2013).
115. Ligon v. City of New York, 736 F.3d 231, 233 (2d Cir. 2013).
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To many, the abbreviated process offended fundamental ideas of procedural
fairness. 116 It is ordinarily assumed that, to achieve fair outcomes in an
adversarial system, the parties with a stake in a factual and legal question must
have an opportunity to be heard, so that each side may argue the facts and factual
inferences supporting its position, argue how the law should be interpreted, and
argue how the law should apply to the facts. It is unusual for an appellate court to
make factual and legal findings without assistance from the parties. Further, even
if a court were to assume that the facts and law were foregone conclusions and
that it needed no assistance, it would ordinarily give the parties an opportunity to
be heard, if only so that the parties would perceive that the court was treating
them fairly and respectfully. One can imagine exceptions where, for example, a
trial judge must swiftly impose order or where the court is making ministerial
decisions, but that was not the case here.
Adding to the strangeness of the appellate process in the stop-and-frisk cases
was that the panel withdrew its opinion two weeks later and substituted a new one
that ostensibly "explain[ed] in greater detail the basis for our decision to reassign
the cases,"'1 17 but that actually substituted new explanations. First, the opinion
"clarif[ied]" that it did not mean to "imply" that the judge violated the judicial
code of conduct 1 8 - although it had previously said precisely that. Rather, the
panel maintained, Judge Scheindlin's disqualification was required by a federal
statute, 28 U.S.C. § 455(a), requiring judges to disqualify themselves in
proceedings in which their "impartiality might reasonably be questioned."119
Second, the panel did not re-assert that the trial judge improperly applied the
"related case rule." 120 It may have realized that there was no precedent for
disqualifying a trial judge for violating this court rule. Alternatively, it may have
decided on reflection that the judge reasonably applied the rule: as knowledge-
able critics pointed out, the new cases were in fact related to the earlier ones and
to each other; the district judge's application of the rule was consistent with how
other district courts applied the rule; and, in any event, the rule at the time
contained no criteria for determining whether cases were sufficiently related and
gave unguided and unreviewable discretion to the district court. 121 Instead, in the
new opinion, the panel took the view that the judge's comments in the Daniels
116. Kalhan, supra note 11, at 1083.
117. Ligon v. City of New York, 736 E3d 118, 123 (2d Cir. 2013), vacated in part, 743 E3d 362 (2d Cir.
2014).
118. Id. at 128.
119. Id. at 123 124.
120. Id. at 130.
121. At the time, the rules of the Southern District of New York required a lawyer filing a civil case to
disclose when the case might be related to another pending one, at which point the new case would be referred to
the judge presiding over the one filed earlier. That judge would have sole and unreviewable discretion whether
to accept or reject the new case. See generally Chevron Corp. v. Danziger, 11 Civ. 0691 (LAK), 2011 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 50724 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 7, 2011). The court rule was subsequently amended. See generally Katherine A.
Macfarlane, The Danger of Nonrandom Case Assignment: How the Southern District of New York's "Related
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colloquy, which the panel quoted extensively, would lead a reasonable observer
to "conclude that the appearance of impartiality had been compromised."
' 122
Additionally, although not re-asserting that Judge Scheindlin's media interviews
provided an independent basis for disqualifying her, the panel maintained that the
interviews exacerbated the appearance of partiality. 
123
The new opinion attempted to justify the court's odd process. The court
acknowledged that neither the parties nor the trial judge herself had raised the
possibility of recusal, but asserted that it is not unusual for the court to "reassign"
a case to ensure that it is decided by a different district judge who was "without
even an appearance of partiality." 124 The panel noted that often the Second
Circuit "reassign[ed] a case without the issue having been raised or briefed by the
parties or considered by the district judge." 125 It quoted a 1941 Supreme Court
decision recognizing that in "exceptional cases ... where injustice might
otherwise result," reviewing courts can consider legal questions that were never
raised or considered by the trial court. 
126
This explanation overlooks that the panel was not reassigning the case but was
disqualifying the trial judge-a crucial distinction. 127 The cases cited by the
panel involving reassignments on remand were based on 28 U.S.C. § 2106, which
allows an appellate court, upon reviewing a district court's judgment and
remanding the case for further proceedings, to issue any order "as may be just
under the circumstances." 128 After deciding a party's appeal and concluding that
the district court ruled erroneously, the appellate court sometimes (though rarely)
orders reassignment to prevent what would now be recognized as cognitive
bias-namely, that the original judge would, if only unconsciously, remain
influenced by his or her earlier, erroneous way of thinking. 129 Section 2106
provided no authority in the stop-and-frisk cases since the appeals court had not
Cases" Rule Shaped Stop-and-Frisk Rulings, 19 MICH. J. RACE & L. 199 (2014) (criticizing the earlier court
rule and noting that it was amended after the Second Circuit decision).
122. Ligon, 736 F.3d at 123.
123. Id. at 126 27.
124. Id. at 128 29.
125. Id. at 129.
126. Id. (quoting Hormel v. Helvering, 312 U.S. 552, 557 (1941)).
127. See Kalhan, supra note 11, at 1098 99; see generally Toby J. Heytens, Reassignment, 66 STAN. L. REV.
1(2014).
128. 28 U.S.C. § 2106 provides:
The Supreme Court or any other court of appellate jurisdiction may affirm, modify, vacate, set aside or
reverse any judgment, decree, or order of a court lawfully brought before it for review, and may
remand the cause and direct the entry of such appropriate judgment, decree, or order, or require such
further proceedings to be had as may be just under the circumstances.
129. See, e.g., United States v. Robin, 553 F.2d 8 (2d Cir. 1977). But see In re Kellogg Brown & Root, 756
E3d 754, 763 (D.C. Cir. 2014) ("[Appellate courts on rare occasions will reassign a case sua sponte .... But
whether requested to do so or considering the matter sua sponte, we will reassign a case only in the exceedingly
rare circumstance that a district judge's conduct is 'so extreme as to display clear inability to render fair
judgment."') (quoting Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540, 551 (1994)). See generally Jack B. Weinstein, The
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yet ruled on the district court's judgment. Further, the panel did not purport to
invoke this provision. According to the panel, "the cases were reassigned ...
solely pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 455(a)," 130 which provides that a judge "shall
disqualify [her]self in any proceeding in which [her] impartiality might
reasonably be questioned." 
131
Under the disqualification statute, it is doubtful that an appellate court has the
authority to act on its own initiative except perhaps in egregious circumstances. A
party must not only seek a judge's disqualification but do so in timely fashion, 132
rather than waiting to see how the judge rules before objecting and squandering
judicial resources in the process. If appellate courts cannot consider untimely
disqualification motions, it is anomalous for them to disqualify the trial judge in
the entire absence of a motion.133 The Second Circuit had previously noted the
possibility that disqualification of a district judge might be justified even absent a
timely motion if "the damage done to the appearance of justice is so
egregious," 134 but it did not purport to apply that standard in the stop-and-frisk
cases.
C. THE SECOND CIRCUIT'S QUESTIONABLE EXPLANATIONS
Even assuming that the Second Circuit has authority to disqualify a district
court on its own initiative, one might be skeptical of its reasons for doing so in the
stop-and-frisk cases. While taking pains to avoid "suggest[ing] that a district
court can never ... advise[] the party of its legal or procedural options," the panel
concluded that "in combination with [Judge Scheindlin's] public statements"
more than five years later, the Daniels colloquy might lead "a reasonable
observer [to] question the [judge's] impartiality." 135 This was based on the
assumption that in the Daniels colloquy Judge Scheindlin affirmatively advised
the plaintiffs to file a new claim. But this is not the only possible interpretation.
One might equally say that the trial judge disclosed why she was disinclined to
review police stop-and-frisk practices in the pending proceeding-namely, that
there was a better context in which to do so-and offered the plaintiffs a chance
Limited Power of the Federal Courts of Appeals to Order a Case Reassigned to Another District Judge, 120
F.R.D. 267 (1988) (criticizing reassignments by appellate courts).
130. Ligon, 736 F.3d at 169.
131. 28 U.S.C. § 455(a).
132. See, e.g., Miller v. Tony & Susan Alamo Found., 924 F.2d 143, 146 (10th Cir. 1991) ("Section 455 has
been interpreted to require a party to make its motion and facts known at the earliest possible time." (citation
omitted)); Apple v. Jewish Hosp. & Med. Ctr., 829 F.2d 326, 333 (2d Cir. 1987).
133. See, e.g., United States v. Conforte, 624 F.2d 869 (9th Cir. 1980) (Kennedy, J.) (stating that the issue of
disqualification must be presented to trial judge before it can be raised on appeal).
134. United States v. Bayless, 201 F.3d 116, 130 (2d Cir. 2000) ("[T]here may well be circumstances in
which no timely recusal motion is made, but in which the damage done to the appearance of justice is so
egregious that, despite the moral hazard created, recusal would be warranted under § 455(a).").
135. Ligon, 736 F.3d at 125.
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to change her mind. Surely judges need some latitude to question litigants and
probe their arguments without fear that judicial comments and questions, viewed
in the harshest light, will be construed as evidence of partiality. That is in part
why an earlier appellate decision, cited several times by the panel on other issues,
noted that "courts are loath to require recusal based on statements made in a
judicial context (e.g., in a status hearing or a decision rendered from the bench),
even when such statements might suggest, to some extent, pre-determination of
the merits." 136
Further, even if one might interpret Judge Scheindlin's words as encouraging a
future lawsuit, that would not itself reflect disqualifying partiality. While judges
may not "force, require or coerce" a party to take a procedural route, judges may
engage in "inquisitive colloquy" in which they question a party's procedural
choices or call attention to procedural alternatives. 137 As active participants in the
adjudicatory process, judges may even encourage procedural options that would
promote fair outcomes. 138
The panel's criticism of Judge Scheindlin's quoted comments to the media
seem equally uncharitable. Judge Scheindlin expressed no favoritism to either
side, and she was evidently careful not to talk about pending cases. Consequently,
the appeals court could not claim that she violated the judicial conduct rule
regulating extrajudicial communications. Further, even if she made some implicit
reference to the stop-and-frisk cases, disqualification would not necessarily be
warranted. In an earlier civil rights case that was similarly contentious, the
Second Circuit rejected a party's disqualification motion where the presiding trial
judge gave an interview to a local newspaper that expressly touched on the
pending litigation. 139 The court reasoned: "In his interview, [the trial judge] only
restated what he had been saying in open court for the past few years and did not
discuss the details of remedy implementation," which was the issue pending
before the court. 140
Ultimately, the question of whether to submit to an interview, particularly
while one is presiding over a high-profile case, seems to be a matter of taste and
judicial philosophy. One might believe that judges should keep a low profile to
avoid what Chief Justice Roberts has termed "the personalization of judicial
politics ' 141 or to promote what might be described as a misleading "veneer of
136. In re Boston's Children First, 244 F.3d 164, 169 n.9 (1 st Cir. 2001) (citing United States v. Grinnell, 384
U.S. 563, 581 82 (1966)); United States v. Lopez, 944 F.2d 33, 37 (1st Cir. 1991).
137. United States v. Wilkerson, 208 F.3d 794, 798 (9th Cir. 2000).
138. See Ramirez v. Elgin Pontiac GMC, Inc., 187 E Supp. 2d 1041 (N.D. Ill. 2002).
139. United States v. Yonkers Bd. of Educ., 946 F.2d 180 (2d Cir. 1991).
140. Id. at 182; see also United States v. Haldeman, 559 F.2d 31, 134 36 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (per curiam) (en
banc) (finding that district judge's interview statements, even if they could be viewed as referring to a pending
legal question, did not warrant disqualification).
141. Jeffrey Rosen, Robert's Rules, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Jan/Feb. 2007, at 112.
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neutrality." 142 That is a view more easily maintained by appointed rather than
elected judges, who, at least in contested elections, have a legitimate and
constitutionally protected interest in submitting to interviews. 143 But the judicial
conduct rules leave room for different philosophies and give individual judges,
including appointed judges, substantial latitude to act in accordance with their
own philosophies. The appeals court decision in the stop-and-frisk cases did not
give much explanation for singling out the trial judge's public statements in this
particular case.
D. THE OPPORTUNITY TO ATTRIBUTE QUESTIONABLE JUDICIAL
DECISIONS TO THE JUDGES' BIASES
It is hard to come to the Second Circuit decisions objectively. One's views of
whether the disqualification of Judge Scheindlin was procedurally fair or whether
the appeals court's justifications were persuasive will likely be influenced by
one's view of the police stop-and-frisk policy and of Judge Scheindlin's
decisions. Fans of Judge Scheindlin's rulings will likely be foes of her
disqualification, and vice versa.
But suppose you look at the Second Circuit decisions and think they do not
make sense procedurally or substantively. You wonder why three very bright
federal appellate judges with very bright law clerks removed a federal district
judge from a case over which she presided for years and in which she wrote
scholarly, lengthy, meticulous opinions; why the appellate judges ruled even
before hearing argument on the merits of the opinions, and did so based primarily
on comments the district judge made on the record in another related case years
earlier about which no one ever formally complained; and why the judges took
this extraordinary procedural step without hearing the trial judge's side of the
story and with questionable legal justifications. Many might conclude that the
three appellate judges simply got it wrong and leave it at that. But one who is
troubled by the Second Circuit decisions will be tempted to look beneath the
surface and to ask, "what's really going on here?"
One might consider whether the judges had some secret motivation known
only to themselves. One possibility was that they were attempting to influence the
mayoral election, 144 but this seems highly unlikely because the polls put the
142. Bruce A. Green & Rebecca Roiphe, Regulating Discourtesy on the Bench: A Study in the Evolution of
Judicial Independence, N.Y.U. ANN. SuRv. AM. L. 497, 551 54 (2008).
143. See Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765 (2002).
144. See Kalhan, supra note 11, at 1101 (arguing that "a reasonable observer with knowledge of all relevant
facts might easily conclude that" the appellate judges were "acting strategically" with the goal of influencing the
election, "whether consciously or unconsciously").
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eventual winner way out in front. 14 5 Another possibility was that, having
prejudged the merits of the appeal, they sought to discredit the district court
opinions or to give a small victory to the police, precisely because there would
never be a chance to rule on the merits of the appeal. This seems more plausible.
But given the high repute in which the judges and their court are held, the far
greater likelihood is that the judges had no hidden objective but were convinced
that they were wisely exercising their authority given the law and facts.
One might also consider, however, whether the judges had secret reasons
hidden even from themselves. One lesson of the implicit bias literature,
consistent with what the legal realists taught decades ago, is that prejudices and
other irrational thought processes may unconsciously influence judges who, after
all, are only human. 146 Knowing this, critics might be tempted to dig deeper into
the judges' psyches and to speculate that the judges were affected by biases of
which they were not necessarily themselves aware. 147 The Second Circuit
decisions illustrate various ways in which one might employ the rhetoric of
implicit bias, because so many implicit biases arguably could have been at play.
The most obvious candidate is implicit racial bias. This was, of course, the
central theme of the stop-and-frisk cases. One might speculate that, like the New
York City police, the appellate judges were influenced by unconscious racial
attitudes or assumptions. Perhaps, notwithstanding the judicial panel's racial and
ethnic diversity, the judges were unconsciously prejudiced against the young
people of color who comprised the plaintiff class, and were therefore predisposed
to rule against them or to devalue their civil rights and, therefore, inclined to
remove any district judge whose fact-findings favored the plaintiffs. Or perhaps
their decision was influenced by an unconscious assumption that young black and
Hispanic men are more likely than young white men to be criminals. This might
have led the court to assume that Judge Scheindlin erred in finding biased
policing practices and that her error must have been influenced by a judicial bias
against the City, which the appellate court was then inclined to read into her
colloquy in Daniels and her interviews with the media. Or perhaps the judges
were unconsciously skeptical of the very idea of implicit racial bias as a force
influencing police on-the-spot decision-making and were inclined to believe
that we are living in a post-racial world. 148 This, too, would have led the judges
to assume that the district court's contrary determination must have been
145. Michael Schwirtz, Mayor's Race Intrudes on Stop-and-Frisk Case, Judges Say, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 30,
2013, atA23 (reporting on Oct. 30, 2014 that "polls indicate [Bill de Blasio] is on course to trounce his opponent
in the election next week").
146. See note 25, supra (citing authority).
147. See Greenwald & Krieger, supra note 18, at 965 67 (arguing that, given our knowledge of the
pervasiveness of racial bias, when there are no plausible racially neutral explanations for pervasive racial
discrimination, one can assume that implicit racial bias is at play even in individual cases).
148. See generally Cynthia Lee, Making Race Salient: Trayvon Martin and Implicit Bias in a Not Yet
Post-Racial World, 91 N.C.L. REV. 1555 (2013).
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distorted-or biased-to explain her ruling against the City. Of course, there
would be no basis whatsoever to accuse the appellate judges of conscious racial
bias, and no one has suggested that a study of their individual judicial records
reveals systematic implicit bias on their part. But, if not readily discernible,
implicit racial bias in the United States is nonetheless pervasive, not readily
disproved, and invisible even to oneself.
Alternatively, one might imagine that the judges fell prey to implicit gender
bias. 149 The three male judges on the appeals panel may have been unconsciously
predisposed against, perhaps even jealous of, an outspoken female jurist who
garnered publicity, gave interviews to the press, and seemingly bullied the City
and its police department. The removal decision gave the judges an opportunity
to take her down a few pegs. Some might have doubted whether the appellate
judges would have disqualified one of their male colleagues under comparable
circumstances.
A third possible bias was suggested by Judge Scheindlin's interviews: one
might speculate that the appellate judges harbored an unconscious pro-
government bias. In recent presidential administrations, many more former
prosecutors than former defense lawyers have been appointed to the federal
bench.150 Perhaps for that reason, the defense bar widely perceives the federal
bench as tilted against their clients-e.g., federal judges are unduly disposed to
credit the police, to discredit criminal defendants, and to accept prosecutors'
arguments and recommendations. One who takes this view of the federal bench
might perceive the removal of Judge Scheindlin as one in a line of decisions
explained by the federal court's predisposition toward law enforcement.
A fourth explanation for the Second Circuit panel's decision, suggested
semi-seriously at the outset of this article, might be an anti-academic or
anti-liberal-academic bias. It is a conservative trope, undoubtedly accepted by
some conservative jurists, that universities are dominated by liberal professors.
So, one might posit that the somewhat conservative appellate judges, once they
had read Judge Scheindlin's opinions, were put off by her reliance on seemingly
left-leaning academics with regard to both her fact-finding and her proposed
remedy. This might have influenced the appellate judges to be skeptical of her
fair-mindedness. It might be noted that two of the appellate judges were Clinton
appointees and none would be numbered among the most conservative judges
nationally, but on the other hand, even the more "liberal" judges are centrist by
comparison with left-leaning academics.
149. Cf Toobin, The Last Word, supra note 104 (observing that federal prosecutors "tend to describe
Scheindlin as 'difficult, 'shrill,' and 'demanding,' terms that never seem to be applied to male judges, or to men
generally").
150. See, e.g., Bob Egelko, Obama Nominations Heavy on Ex-Prosecutors, SFGATE (Feb. 3, 2013),
http://www. sfgate.com/nation/article/Obama-nominations-heavy-on-ex-prosecutors-4248122.php (reporting
statistics).
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Finally, two other possibly relevant cognitive biases are unrelated to group
prejudices. First, the appellate judges may have been influenced by confirmation
bias. In theory, the question of whether Judge Scheindlin's impartiality might
reasonably be questioned because of her comments on or off the bench should
have been determined independently of the appellate court's prior impressions of
the judge's even-handedness. But the appellate judges may have been predis-
posed to believe that she was biased. For example, they might have been aware of
Judge Scheindlin's anti-government reputation. Or they may have concluded
from their preliminary review of her opinions that her fact-findings in the
stop-and-frisk cases were one-sided. Either way, they may have read Judge
Scheindlin's colloquy and interviews, both of which were subject to interpreta-
tion, in light of an assumption that she was not impartial.
One who reads the Second Circuit opinions skeptically may also see belief
perseverance at work. Awareness of this cognitive bias explains why appeals
courts sometimes reassign cases after they reverse the district court: the original
district judge would have a tendency to adhere to his or her prior, but erroneous,
opinion. 151 Belief perseverance on the part of the appellate judges would explain
why, after deciding to withdraw its initial hasty opinion, the appeals court issued
a new one reaching the same conclusion based on different rationales. Even after
deciding that their initial rationales were inadequate, it would have been
cognitively difficult for the judges to have acknowledged that they made a
mistake in disqualifying Judge Scheindlin, and easier to come up with new
explanations. Perhaps, in hindsight, after withdrawing its original opinion, the
panel should have reassigned the case to a different group of appellate judges
who could look at the question of judicial bias-as well as the merits-without
an unconscious pre-commitment to the outcome.
Were any of the judges on the panel actually affected by any of these
unconscious biases-and, if so, which judges and which biases? Individuals can
be tested to ascertain the extent to which they hold inappropriate stereotypes, 
152
but the appellate judges have not been publicly tested. And, as the stop-and-frisk
cases illustrate, data can sometimes be aggregated and analyzed by experts to
determine whether an individual's or institution's recurring conduct appears to be
influenced by unconscious biases. But one cannot prove implicit bias from a
single decision, and no one has analyzed the decisions of the Second Circuit
judges in an attempt to ascertain whether the appellate judges act on unconscious
racial or gender stereotypes or unconscious pro-government or anti-academic
tendencies. At the same time, one might assume that, by training and experience,
151. United States v. Johnson, 387 Fed. App'x 105 (2d Cir. 2010); see also supra note 46 and accompanying
text.
152. See Greenwald et al., Measuring Individual Differences in Implicit Cognition: The Implicit Association
Test, 74 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 1464 (1998) (discussing Implicit Association Test).
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judges are practiced at putting biases, even unconscious ones, to the side. 153 The
appellate deliberative and writing processes, one might suppose, minimize the
role of implicit biases by emphasizing explicit reasoning and justification, and by
promoting dialogue among judges and law clerks, that may counterbalance
individual biases. But the fact remains that we will never know one way or the
other. And the uncertainty gives lawyers latitude, if not in serious scholarship
then in the popular press, in blogs or in informal discussion, to speculate or
postulate that the judges were biased-not overtly and not in the disqualifying
sense, but unconsciously or implicitly. This raises the question of whether
lawyers should give voice to such ruminations: Should lawyers accuse judges of
implicit bias?
III. THE TROUBLE WITH "BIAS"
When a court goes astray, as many believe the Second Circuit did in
disqualifying Judge Scheindlin, one might speculate that the court was implicitly
biased. There may be value to such speculation. But on balance, public discourse
about judging would be better if critics left this rhetorical arrow in their quiver.
In the short term, the obvious reason to suggest that judges were biased is to
discredit a decision with which one disagrees. Given the judicial norm of
impartiality, an accusation of bias, if taken seriously, will weaken public respect
for, and undermine the legitimacy of, the opinion. If there are any readers
inclined to believe that judges are infallible, the discussion of implicit bias may
also help explain how it is possible that judges can get it wrong.
In the longer term, if one is correct that a judge's decision is wrong, speculation
about implicit bias might be a legitimate step in an effort to try to understand why
the court went wrong and ultimately to improve its process. One might point to
the possibility of implicit bias in a particular decision in order to promote greater
public awareness and more robust public discussion of the role of implicit bias in
judicial decision making generally, toward the aim of encouraging efforts to
diversify the bench 154 or of encouraging judges to take remedial measures.
Discussing implicit bias in the context of a discredited decision may also
contribute to a more realistic public understanding of how judges decide cases,
and, in particular, that the judicial process is not a scientific or mechanical one.
In the end, however, these justifications do not seem especially compelling. If a
critic makes a persuasive case that an opinion is poorly reasoned, then the opinion
already will be discredited, and there is little need to put another nail in the coffin
153. Cf JOEL COHEN, BLINDFOLDS OFF: JUDGES ON How THEY DECIDE 99 (2014) (quoting District Judge
Alvin Hellerstein's observation that "[jiustice does not require absolute purity, but a check on bias").
154. Cf. Mary Kreiner Ramirez, Into the Twilight Zone: Informing Judicial Discretion in Federal
Sentencing, 57 DRAKE L. REv. 591, 614 (2009) ("As the federal judiciary continues to diversify, positive
associations with colleagues may erode some implicit associational biases.").
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by speculating about whether unconscious stereotypes or other unconscious
processes led the judges astray. If one's legal analysis of the court's ruling is
unpersuasive, however, the charge of implicit bias may undeservedly bolster the
critique and discredit the judge's decision for reasons unrelated to its quality.
One might also be skeptical that exploring the possible role of implicit bias in
an individual decision will promote valuable public awareness and discourse.
The informed public knows "that judges ... bring to the bench ideologies,
preconceptions, and intuitions."155 In particular, there is public discussion
drawing on social science research regarding how implicit biases affect judging.
While continued discussion is important, it is questionable whether accusing an
individual judge of bias in an individual case will add much to the efforts of
social scientists and others who have been teaching lawyers and judges about
implicit bias based on serious research. Using a single case as an anecdote about
implicit bias may even be counterproductive, because the judge responsible for
the opinion in question and other judges may respond defensively.
Whatever utility there may be in accusing a judge of implicit bias is
substantially outweighed by the harms. Most importantly for those concerned
with fair and accurate discourse, implicit bias cannot be fairly inferred from a
single decision. As Judge Scheindlin's stop-and-frisk decisions illustrate, it takes
a great deal of work to discern whether implicit bias is influencing conduct, and
to make that determination, one needs more than a single reference point--one
needs recurring conduct. In the stop-and-frisk cases, for example, lawyers and
witnesses undoubtedly spent thousands of hours amassing and analyzing the
evidence and even then, the answer was disputed. Based on statistical analyses, it
could be said that implicit racial bias generally influenced how police imple-
mented stop-and-frisk policy, but it would have been impossible to conclude that
any particular stop-and-frisk was the product of implicit bias. While there is
nothing wrong with accusing a judge or the judiciary of bias if an analysis of a
large enough sample of opinions supports that conclusion, no social scientist
could validly infer from a single bad opinion that a judge was unconsciously
biased. A charge of implicit bias leveled against a single decision, such as a
charge against the Second Circuit's disqualification of Judge Scheindlin, can
never be more than speculation: it is as likely to be wrong as right. Most would
consider it unfair to criticize others, including judges, based on mere conjecture
of this sort.
As the stop-and-frisk cases illustrate, unprovable accusations of bias are just
too easy to make. Those who disliked Judge Scheindlin's rulings accused her of
political (liberal) and anti-government biases, while, as discussed, the appellate
judges could have been accused of a host of other implicit biases. The very fact
that one can posit so many different biases without a clue as to which, if any, were
155. Green & Roiphe, supra note 142, at 524.
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at play, points to the emptiness of this rhetoric.
Besides the risk that critics will often be wrong in attributing bad decisions to
implicit bias, there is the likelihood that critics will employ the rhetoric as a
substitute for a close and persuasive critique. Judges tend to write persuasive
opinions, and those who favor the outcome of an opinion are particularly
disposed to find its reasoning convincing. Persuading others that the court
employed an unfair process, got the facts wrong, or bungled the law, is no easy
task. The implicit bias charge may detract from the more important task of
persuasive analysis or be used to discredit an opinion that was not wrong at all.
In addition to being unenlightening, an unprovable accusation of implicit
judicial bias may be considered unprofessional. Lawyers have sometimes been
sanctioned for making unfounded bias charges against judges or other lawyers. 156
To be sure, robust speech about judges, judging and judicial qualifications is
crucial in a democracy, and lawyers, as knowledgeable observers, most
especially should participate, leveling harsh criticism of judges where well-
founded. 157 But a charge of implicit bias, which is inherently unprovable, brings
down the quality of discourse and clouds understanding.
Yet another problem is the ambiguity of the accusation of judicial "bias."
Perhaps there is a need for a new vocabulary so that "bias" is not used to describe
so many different concepts relevant to the judicial process. When a critic
speculates that a judge's decision was influenced by implicit bias, others may
easily misunderstand. One may assume that the judge is being accused of having
conscious prejudices-for example, holding racist beliefs-when the reference is
to unconscious attitudes. Or one may understand that an accusation of implicit
bias implies that the judge should be removed from the case, whereas the
unconscious attitudes or thought processes in question will not implicate the
judicial conduct codes. Even if the implicit bias claim is correctly understood, it
may be unclear what kind of implicit bias is being suggested. One may assume
the suggestion is that the judge is unconsciously prejudiced against social groups
(e.g., influenced by implicit racial or gender bias), while what is meant is that the
judge was influenced by cognitive biases such as confirmation bias to which
everyone is susceptible.
Finally, there is some danger that unsubstantiated charges of implicit bias will
cheapen the concept of bias and detract from the seriousness of legitimate claims.
There is substantial litigation about bias and prejudice in employment, criminal
156. See Amy R. Mashburn, Making Civility Democratic, 47 Hous. L. REv. 1147, 1163 (2011) (noting that in
cases in which courts found lawyers to be uncivil, offensive or unprofessional, the second largest category
involved "speech that accused judges or other members of the legal system of general bias against the lawyer
and his/her client").
157. See generally Bruce A. Green, Lawyers'Professional Independence: Overrated or Undervalued?, 46
AKRON L. REv. 599 (2013).
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law enforcement and other contexts. 158 In the stop-and-frisk class actions before
Judge Scheindlin, for example, the evidence of implicit racial bias played an
important role in establishing the illegality of police practices and the City's
indifference. Judge Scheindlin's finding that police conduct was affected by
implicit bias came after a full evidentiary hearing. The importance of findings
such as this one may be undercut when critics of judicial decisions make bias
accusations that are entirely speculative and cannot be substantiated.
CONCLUSION
As we learn more from social scientists about how unconscious biases
influence everyone's decision making, the temptation increases to blame
individual judicial decisions on implicit prejudices against social groups or on
other implicit biases when the judges' own explanations seem unpersuasive. As
discussed, the recent stop-and-frisk cases serve as a good example.
Accusations of "bias," with various different meanings, were thrown around
everywhere in the stop-and-frisk cases, and there was room for more. Based on a
lengthy adversarial hearing, Judge Scheindlin found that implicit racial bias led
the New York City police to implement stop-and-frisk policy disproportionately
harshly against minorities. The conservative press, critical of her decisions,
accused Judge Scheindlin of anti-government bias and liberal political or
philosophical biases that distorted her perception of the evidence. While the cases
were pending, the City joined in questioning the judge's partiality, producing an
arguably misleading report purporting to show that her track record of published
decisions in criminal cases demonstrated her bias against law enforcement. Judge
Scheindlin defended herself, suggesting that she was even-handed and indepen-
dent while some other judges were biased in favor of law enforcement. The
Second Circuit found that the judge's remarks contributed to the appearance that
she was biased against the City.
Critics of the Second Circuit decisions entered the fray, suggesting that it was
the Second Circuit judges who were displaying partiality, although the critics did
not necessarily specify what sort of implicit biases were supposedly at work.
Drawing on contemporary teachings about implicit biases, and knowing that
judges, like others, are susceptible to implicit biases of various sorts, critics might
have elaborated by suggesting that the appellate judges had themselves fallen
under the sway of racial or gender biases, pro-government or anti-academic
biases, cognitive biases, or others.
On balance, however, it is better to resist the temptation to import "implicit
bias" rhetoric into critiques of individual judicial decisions. A charge of bias will
tend to be confusing precisely because of the many senses in which the term may
158. See supra notes 19 & 20.
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be used, and a single judicial decision will be too small a sample to justify the
conclusion that the judge was biased in one way or another. The charge of judicial
bias is likely to serve as a substitute for, rather than as the culmination of, a
persuasive critique of a judge's opinion, and where unprovable, the charge of
judicial bias may detract from more serious bias charges made in other contexts.
In the end, unproven accusations of unconscious bias detract from fair and
informative discourse about judicial decision-making.

